Our operational boats would be the first to complete turnover. USSAG was activated on 11 February 1973 under the command of commander of MACV. Wet-rice farming, the principal agricultural activity, requires an intricate system of irrigation dikes and canals. Thus, a truly international conglomerate of soldiers and sailors launched the combined operation against Doan-10 on 22 June 1969. Given the seriousness of the military situation, the performance of the Vietnamese Navy was far from satisfactory. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was a joint-service command of the United States Department of Defense. Fish from the rivers and seas are an important staple in the Vietnamese diet. With few exceptions, the Coastal Groups (the Junk bases) are located in areas considered undesirable for duty. Frequently, these were individuals who by reason of age or infirmity were ineligible for service in the Uniformed Services. The advisory role was taking second priority and receiving less command attention than the growing direct involvement of U. S. fighting units. In the North, warnings were scrawled on the walls of public buildings, urging the populace to flee in advance of the Viet Minh Army. Day and night, hundreds of thousands of porters and young volunteers crossed passes and forded rivers in spite of enemy planes and delayed-action bombs. Teachers were found and hired. These in turn were tied in with the U. S. Task Force 115 operations through the various Coastal Surveillance Centers. Control of the waterways of Vietnam also implies control of a large part of that country's population. The Special Forces company commander reported that he couldnt hold the beachhead overnight and that with "very little arms and ammunition remaining, it was not worthwhile to land again. His long-time associate and premier, Ngo Dinh Diem, announced on 7 July 1955 that a referendum would be held in October to permit the people to choose between Bao Dai and himself. The Riverine Assault Force with its 3717 officers and men operated 161 specialized river craft, and these included 103 ATCs, 31 ASPBs, 6 CCBs, 17 Monitors and 4 Refuelers. The Naval Support Activity, Saigon, which was commissioned when the Headquarters Support Activity was disestablished in May 1966, supported naval operations in II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones through its many scattered detachments. Furthermore, ground commanders generally tended to discount the economic and strategic importance of the Nam Can. At peak strength in 1968, the American naval advisory . The interdiction effort that had been directed against these routes was concentrated on the major rivers, and might be likened to an attempt to stem the flow of water through a sieve by the tactic of inserting a limited number of needles in selected openings in the sieve, effective locally, but virtually useless overall. No opposing fire was experienced and after extensively shooting up the area, the ships withdrew. In the morning, shortly after 0800, all three ships moved into Vung Ro Bay, preceded by heavy air strikes and naval gunfire support. By the middle of October 1969, it was estimated that more than 3000 people were living under Vietnamese control in the Nam Can. Hundreds of sampans of all sizes, hundreds of thousands of bamboo rafts crossed rapids and cascades to supply the front. These statistics could of course be interpreted two ways; either there was little sea infiltration, or the counter-infiltration effort was remarkably ineffective. Naval Advisory Group Vietnam Patch. By 1 April 1970, 242 craft, worth more than $68 million, had been turned over under the ACTOV program. Minings in the Long Tau, with relatively few exceptions, involved either limpet mines attached to ships at anchor by swimmers or mines detonated under passing ships from observation points on the river bank. Miscellaneous materials that could not be associated with any one office on the commanders staff also are indicated. The Vietnamese Navy and the advisory effort had expanded sharply. In the North, the intense and tragic struggle for Hue made it absolutely essential that water communication by way of the Perfume River remain open. There was always the danger that one of his attacks might succeed in sinking a large ship in the deep water channel, thereby disrupting the flow of supplies to Saigon. The LSTs has lieutenants or lieutenant commanders. On 1 April 1966 the two roles were separated with the establishment of Naval Forces Vietnam (NAVFORV). All U.S. Army units in South Vietnam, excluding advisory attachments, were assigned to the Army Support Group for administrative and logistical needs. A new task organization, TF 194, was created for Sea Lords, and assets were chopped to "First Sea Lord" for Specific operations by the commanders of Market Time, Game Warden, and the Mobile Riverine Force. Naval Logistic Support, Qui Nhon to Phu Quoc, by Captain Herbert T. King, U. S. Navy, in Naval Review 1969. In the meantime, TF 116, Game Warden, had been established (on 18 December 1965) with an assigned mission "to assist the Government of South Vietnam in denying the enemy the use of the major rivers of the Delta and the Rung Sat Special Zone. Rear Admiral Ward was assigned additional duty as CTF 116. Task Force Clearwater. (4) That all Navy commands, unless otherwise specified, be under the operational control of ComNavForV. With the elapse of five months, all the three same brigades remained in the new division, but the brigade at Chu Lai was now named the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, after a responsibility swap that had occurred in August. Coast Guard Squadron One provided WPBs for barrier patrols along the seventeenth parallel and in the Gulf of Thailand. After reorganization he was succeeded by General William C. Westmoreland in June 1964, followed by General Creighton W. Abrams (July 1968) and General Frederick C. Weyand (June 1972). The Marlins were phased out of service by 1967. With the arrival of the second APB, the USS Colleton (APB-36), in early May, plans were made to move all these units of the Mobile Riverine Base to Dong Tam. (5) That ComNavForV be responsible to ComUSMACV for logistic support of all naval forces, including III MAF in I Corps. The streets of the two principal evacuation centers, Hanoi and Haiphong, were soon choked with masses of desperate people. In June the first operational test of the offshore support ship concept was initiated when the USS Tortuga (BD-26), which had arrived in May, anchored near the mouths of the Co Chien and Bassac Rivers. At this time the Government of Vietnam commanded little support within its own structure. In following months additional equipment was transferred to the Vietnamese Navy, primarily patrol craft, and accelerated training of both officers and enlisted men began; some of it in schools in the United States. An old Vietnamese woodcutter, captured and abused by the Viet Cong, escaped to tell Vietnamese interrogators that his captors had boasted that they would "visit" Sea Float someday. Most Navy officers interpreted this as a serious loss of face for the Vietnamese Navy, but a few actually thought that it might be a blessing in disguise, since the Navy would at last have a voice at meetings of the Joint General Staff. On 20 February 1968, Deputy ComUSMACV (Forward) requested that ComNavForV designate a senior naval officer to act as a task force Commander whose mission would be "to coordinate overall activities concerning the movement and protection of LCUs and LCMs through inland waterways to Hue ramps." He practiced and preached the need for his officers to avoid the political involvements which had crippled the Navy for so long. The rivers of the Nam Can, being tidal, are heavily salted. French Union forces suffered more than 172,000 casualties, including 45,000 dead and 48,000 missing. A second attempt was made several hours later, moderate opposition was again experienced, and the ships once more withdrew. [6]:45, Major component commands of MACV were:[2]:60. In the absence of ground forces, the enemy could employ a further application of the strategy of sanctuary, for our boats could pursue" only to the maximum effective range of their installed weapons. The increase in Vietnamese naval manpower, a modest sign of change at best, is a typical example of the handicaps suffered by the program. If the Vietnamese Navy were to continue effective operations in the area after the withdrawal of the U. S. Navy, some sort of an operational and support base would be required. Attempts were made to coordinate their operations with TF 116 and TF 117 units with widely varying success depending upon the areas and personalities concerned. Without the reforms introduced and enforced by this officer, the later "Vietnamization of the naval war would have been virtually impossible. The Commander of the task force could say with obvious pride that "Commanders involved in this unique operation felt that they had succeeded in gaining the most difficult of all military advantages in this warsurprise.. At one time charcoal preparation was an important source of the areas meager wealth. Properly supported by vigorous and aggressive bank patrols, it is possible that the barriers might have succeeded in virtually shutting off what they could only curtail in the absence of the required level of ground support. On 14 April 1967, the first of the permanent Riverine Assault Force support ships, the USS Kemper County (LST-854), arrived at Vung Tau. The second task was to wrest the initiative from the enemy in the Rung Sat Special Zone through aggressive military and psychological campaigns in order to secure the vital Long Tau shipping channel to Saigon. To carry out the politically necessary task of Vietnamizing the naval war, it was estimated that the Vietnamese Navy would require an additional ten thousand men on top of the seventeen and a half thousand it then had. New basing and support concepts were created. Notebooks and pencils were secured and distributed. Vietnamese flags fluttered from the tops of tall cay go poles in each hamlet, and from crude flagstaffs on virtually all water craft, and from the fronts of most of the peoples hootches or shelters. The best evidence seemed to point to the fact that what the Bucklew Report had warned would happen, had happened. Well documented infiltration routes had been traced, and it was one of the three aims of Sea Lords to bar these where they crossed or followed navigable water. 3 Operational Command is the authority to assign missions or forces. The irregulars were ordinarily recruited from the population in the vicinity of each coastal group. The Fleet Reserve Association pledged to raise $75,000 to support "Project Pay Dirtan expansion of the animal husbandry program. "River Patrol Relearned, by Commander S. A. Swarztrauber, U. S. Navy, in Naval Review 1970. There was a general reluctance within the Sea Forces to maintain active patrols. It was decided, therefore, to shift to a standard family of small arms, using the same caliber of ammunition, and provide more modern supporting weapons. On 18 May 1966, Captain B. A small U.S. military headquarters was needed to continue the military assistance program for the southern Republic of Vietnam Military Forces and supervise the technical assistance still required to complete the goals of Vietnamization. In the United States, "Project Buddy Base was launched to encourage U. S. Navy bases to provide equipment, material, encouragement and advice to Vietnamese Navy bases in the overall effort to raise the standard of living of VNN personnel and their dependents. $9.99; $9.99; Publisher Description. Near the firing line, supply operations had to be carried out in the shortest possible time. In October 1968, a program was initiated to gradually rotate all Cua Viet personnel back to Da Nang or Tan My, to ensure that no one would be required to spend more than six months at the advanced base. The building was designed and constructed under the supervision of the U.S. Navy Officer in Charge of Construction RVN. Advisory Team 143, Naval Advisory Group Vietnam - Navy Unit Directory They were given hot meals, small gifts, and services which ran the gamut from sampan motor repair to the grinding of woodcutters axes on a wheel specially acquired for that purpose in Nha Trang, and shipped to Sea Float by CTF 115. There were four flag officers either on hand or with orders to Vietnam at the time of Vice Admiral Zumwalts assumption of commandComNavForV, Deputy ComNavForV, Commander U. S. Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, and the Officer in Charge of Construction. The Vietnamese leadership, on which the ultimate success of the plan rested, was already heavily burdened. The Brown Water Navy in Vietnam - Warboats.org The people came from all over the Delta to harvest the wood and fish of the area. In May 1961, President Kennedy announced an expansion of the Military Assistance Program for Vietnam, including large increases in the paramilitary Junk Force, which had been operating some 80 sailing junks on patrols near the seventeenth parallel, since about I960. It was obvious that from an operational standpoint the establishment of a permanent base on the Cua Lon or Bo De Rivers, capable of supporting PCFs, junks, and river assault craft, was highly desirable. Task Force 115 consisted of seven DERs, two MSOs, two LSTs originally used to provide radar coverage of the Mekong River entrances, five SP-2H patrol aircraft based at Tan Son Nhut Airfield at Saigon, and Coast Guard Squadron One with nine WPBs based at An Thoi and eight at Da Nang. These were given the nicknames Friendship and Platypus. In fact, many of those responsibilities fell on the U. S. Navy by default and, as has been shown, it was our policy at the highest levels to return responsibility for operations to the Vietnamese Navy as soon as that Navy was prepared to accept it. His command and control decisions were shaped by the following principles: (1) U. S. Navy operations in Vietnam would be coordinated with Vietnamese Operations, allowing integrated operations to be instituted as soon as practicable; (2) facilities required for U. S. naval operations would be located with Vietnamese naval installations so that support operations could be integrated, and later turnover of the facilities more practically achieved. The number of people then living under Vietnamese control in the area was estimated to be about 9,000. Without that cooperation a measure of initiative always remained with the enemy, who had the choice of when and where to dispute the control and ownership of a particular stretch of navigable water. The Navy's fixed wing OV-10 light attack aircraft (Black Ponies) would not arrive in Vietnam until the following April. It was the only uncut supply line of any consequence for allied military forces there. In September 1966, Captain Phan was removed from his post, and command of the Navy passed to Lieutenant General Cao Van Vien of the Vietnamese Army. Naval Association of Canada - Association Navale du Canada USMC Advisory Team Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), Naval Advisory Group The Roman Catholic Church advised its adherents to abandon ancestral homes and fields and seek sanctuary in the South. Huge construction projects were started at Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, and elsewhere. The most economical and direct routes for supplying the Viet Cong were sea routes. The River Patrol Force and the Vietnamese Navy outdid themselves as they brought their highly mobile fire power and unquestioned courage to the defense of the besieged cities. Prior to the establishment of Market Time operations, the Nam Can provided a terminus for many Communist arms shipments arriving from the sea. Four specially outfitted LSTs, scheduled to arrive by September 1966, would replace the original support ships. With an initial authorized strength of 216 men (113 Army), MACV was envisaged as a temporary HQ that would be withdrawn once the Viet Cong insurgency was brought under control. As Market Time throttled infiltration from the sea, the communists simply shifted their principal supply lines to inland routes, which crossed the borders from supposedly "neutral Cambodia and Laos. On 7 August, a Joint Resolution of the Congress affirmed that the United States would continue to support the Republic of Vietnam and "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States. By the end of the year, the U. S. military strength in Vietnam numbered about 23,000 officers and men. Certain small increases had been made in the Sea Forces, however, and overall strength had grown to about 3,500 officers and men. What is that "Naval Advisory Group" in Vietnam - U.S. Militaria Forum Vietnam: Naval Advisory Group At this time a message was received, its origin unclear, which postponed the scheduled landing. The structure of the enemy force responsible for the attacks on Long Tau shipping was rather well known. 0. Under the combined leadership of Vice Admiral Zumwalt and Commodore Chon a tremendous momentum had been built up. If you served in Advisory Team 143, Naval Advisory Group Vietnam, Join TWS for free to reconnect with service friends. Naval Advisor Vietnam | Proceedings - April 1969 Vol. 95/4/794 The 1st Signal Brigade operated the many elements of the Defense Communications System in South Vietnam. After Dien Bien Phu there was simply no French stomach left to continue the struggle, and, on 20 July 1954, a cease-fire agreement was signed at Geneva. U. S. Navy DEs were withdrawn from the Gulf of Thailand on 26 May 1962, and the MSO patrol was suspended on 1 August. We learned about theses guys in SEAL history during BUD/S. This in turn committed Hanoi to a sharp expansion of its infiltration effort. TWS is the largest online community of Veterans existing today and is a powerful Veteran locator. Interim Game Warden bases were established at Nha Be and at Cat Lo. The former had six River Assault Groups (RAGs) which were patterned after the old French Division Naval DAssaut, but with two significant differences. In response, ComNavForV designated Captain Gerald W. Smith, U. S. Navy, as Commander Task Force Clearwater. The consequences of this bitter infighting for the operational effectiveness of the Vietnamese Navy, in this period, may well be imagined. Individual aspects of the U. S. Navy involvement in the war in Vietnam are discussed in previous Naval Review essays listed below as well as those in this edition. Naval Group An International Group As 1963 drew to a close there were 742 U. S. Navy officers and men in Vietnam. After Market Time broke the sea end of this chain, the logistics flow reversed itself and the local Viet Cong were supplied with necessary munitions infiltrated from the north. A concerted and innovative psychological operation might succeed in winning the people to active support of the government of Vietnam, the majority of whom were judged to be apolitical. [2]:59, MACV was disestablished on 29 March 1973 and replaced by the Defense Attach Office (DAO), Saigon. Compensation would be paid by the Government of South Vietnam if they proved to be foreign ships. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was alerted for assignment to Southeast Asia on 11 March 1966. - Veteran J. Reuter. On 11 May the Government of South Vietnam granted formal authorization for U. S. Navy Market Time units to stop, search, and seize vessels not clearly engaged in innocent passage, inside the three mile limit of the Republic of Vietnam's territorial waters. B. Witham, U. S. Navy, relieved Rear Admiral Ward as CTF 116. Cooking, medical work, transport, and the like were carried on right in the trenches, under enemy bombing and crossfire. It is a bitter pill for a whole generation of American "nation builders to swallow, but the brutal fact is that no Vietnamese Government until possibly the present one inspired in its people the loyalty, the unhesitating support, the patriotism and spirit of self-sacrifice essential to the welding of an effective defense force. As a result, on 1 April 1966, Naval Forces, Vietnam, was established to control the Navy's units in the II, III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Until 1964 the Viet Cong were not equipped with standardized weapons and fought with a large variety of French, Russian, Chinese, and captured American arms. Overall command of the navies was exercised by Commander French Naval Forces Far East, who was himself directly subordinate to the theater commander, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces Indochina. In 1963, Vietnamese patrols searched a reported 135,911 junks and 388,725 people, of whom only 6 were determined to be infiltrators. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - Wikipedia In a departure from the planning conference recommendation of the preceding month, the decision was taken to introduce U.S. PCFS (Swifts) for close inshore patrolling. American aid to the French in Indochina burgeoned, and part of this aid took the form of naval ships and craft, mostly small amphibious types, but including one aircraft carrier (the ex-USS Belleau Wood). The Naval Advisory Group continued its advisory role as a subordinate command under COMNAVFORV. LSM 405 landed a company of Vietnamese Army troops at 1830 to assist with the handling of this material, but an hour later, in spite of heated argument by the American advisors, both companies were embarked in LSM 405, although large quantities of arms and munitions remained on the beach. Enlarge. Permission to conduct these operations was granted. The first turnover of U. S. Navy boats and equipment occurred on schedule on 1 February 1969, when River Assault Division 91 of the Riverine Assault Force was dissolved and VNN River Assault and Interdiction Divisions 70 and 71 were formed. Huge stockpiles accumulated just north of the border in Cambodia as the enemy waited for more propitious times to move them into South Vietnam. Naval Advisory Group Vietnam - togetherweserved [11]:52 The DAO was activated on 28 January 1973 with United States Army Major General John E. Murray, formerly MACV director of logistics, as the Defense Attach and United States Air Force Brigadier General Ralph J. Maglione, formerly the MACV J-1 (Director for Manpower and Personnel), as deputy Defense Attach. Despite an avowed intention late in the war to increase the combat role of the Vietnamese, particularly under the ill-starred Navarre Plan, the war ended with the Vietnamese Navy operating only one Infantry Landing Ship Large (LSIL), one LCU, and some thirty smaller amphibious craft. The NavForV program did not stop with the construction of shelters. A most significant factor was the deplorable care, housing, and security of dependent families. In many cases the historians in Saigon made detailed listings of the messages and these are filed as appendices to this inventory. In the summer and fall of 1966, the establishment of a "Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force (MDMAF) was the subject of discussions between ComUSMACV and ComNavForV. The arrival in March of elements of the second River Assault Squadron, RAS 11, permitted the deployment of the first units of RAS 9 to other parts of the Delta. Long lines of motorized cargo sampans moved north through the Cai Nhap9 laden with wood and fish products. The objective of the raiders was "to stir up the enemy and keep him off-balance," but other dividends were soon realized in terms of enemy equipment destroyed, and in the increased commitments he was forced to make in defense of his well entrenched position in the Nam Can. The operational forces had undergone many changes in organization and strength. On 1 August 1965, operational responsibility for Market Time passed from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to General Westmoreland, and operational control from Commander Task Force 71, who had held this duty as a collateral function, to Commander Task Force 115, which was the new designation of the Commander of the Coastal Surveillance Force.
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